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Market principles in higher education seem to have generated a neoliberal awakening. A corollary of such 
market principles is the need for universities to develop effective strategies that give them competitive 
advantage. Thus, competitive advantage represents a key construct of neoliberalism, where the focus in 
this paper is on how university leaders, therefore, make sense of competitive advantage. Based on a 
comparative and instrumental case study using two close rival universities in England, three sensemaking 
dilemmas emerge as core elements of how university leaders conceptualize competitive advantage. The 
first one is about environmental fit or misfit. The second one is about seizing or missing opportunities. 
The third one is about finding a frame of reference. These dilemmas are valuable as they provide a 
possibility to understand what competitive advantage means in higher education, where the standard 
tenets of the concept, such as higher profits, might not always be helpful. 
 













For several decades now, we have seen the incursion of neoliberal±free market±policies into 
higher education systems (Clark, 1983; Marginson, 2013). The degree to which neoliberalism 
has influenced universities varies significantly across countries. Yet, it is evident that pro-market 
trends have had considerable impact on the dynamics of higher education systems in the world, 
from the United States (Etzkowitz et al., 2000) and the United Kingdom (Bratberg, 2011), to 
South Africa (Naidoo, 2004), among others.  
Marketization has certainly impacted the ways of thinking of various groups in higher 
education. One group which according to Naidoo, Shankar and Veer has been particularly 
impacted (2011), is students and their enhanced roles as consumers (Tomlinson, 2016). On the 
other hand, Emerson and Mansvelt wonder what, if any, has been the effect of the metaphor of 
students as consumers on tertiary teachers (2015); where some, as Bolden et al., argue that 
marketization has created confusion and a feeling of alienation in academic staff (2014). Yet, 
another particularly important group affected by neoliberalism is the leaders of universities. 
Thus, the way university leaders are making sense of marketization is of utmost importance to 
understand the impact of marketization on higher education. Smerek argues that we should 
expand our understanding of µthe ways leaders think, such as their cognitive frames, strategy, 
aQGLPSOLFLW OHDGHUVKLSWKHRULHV¶ (2013, 372). Hence, given the importance of marketization on 
higher education, further insight is required on how university leaders are thinking, or better said, 
making sense of some of the key constructs of neoliberalism. Among those key constructs, one 
that is essential, is competitive advantage (Hamel and Prahalad, 2005; Miles and Snow, 1984; 
Abreu Pederzini, 2016); because if the metaphor of the student consumer is spreading, and the 
ideology of competition is thriving, then, it is only natural to wonder, how are university leaders 
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thinking about who is winning in this competitive struggle? Or, in other words, how are 
university leaders making sense of competitive advantage?   
The answer to this research question is arguably context dependent, and one could infer 
that leaders in different universities and countries might make sense of competitive advantage in 
various ways. Yet, it is important to select an instrumental context that provides most of the 
essential features of the neoliberal awakening in higher education, to at least explore a valuable 
angle of such a research question. Such an instrumental case was found in two young universities 
in England, UniA and UniB (as I will refer to the two selected universities for this study). These 
two universities provided an instrumental context, because both universities were founded 
around the same time in the 1960s and have been related in popular culture as close competitors. 
Additionally, these universities intensely experienced the Thatcherite years, when important 
neoliberal trends emerged in English higher education.  
 
Competitive Advantage and Sensemaking 
To understand competitive advantage one must first understand what strategy is. Strategy, 
according to Miles and Snow, is about achieving fit±or at least some level of it±between an 
organization±such as a university±and its external context (1984). The external context, is part of 
the environment of an organization. Here, environment refers to the full context that surrounds a 
university, meaning its external plus also its internal contexts. A university¶V LQWHUQDO context 
comprises its structure, organizational culture, resources, and capabilities, among other elements 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). By contrast, an external context would comprise the broader 
competitive, economic, regulatory, political, social and technological conditions. The latter 
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illustrates the complexity of a full environment, as there is to it an internal element with many 
dimensions, and an external element with many dimensions too.  
The important point here is that universities¶LQWHUQDOFRQWH[WV need to be aligned±perhaps 
not fully, but at least partially±with their external contexts if survival and superior performance 
(i.e. competitive advantage) is aspired. Strategizing, therefore, becomes as Freedman argues, 
about aiming for such alignment or fit between interior and exterior (2013). If universities 
become misaligned, performance might deteriorate, competitive advantage might fade away, 
and even survival could potentially be challenged. This is what Johnson calls the threat of 
µVWUDWHJLFGULIW¶  µgradually« the strategy of the organization will become less and 
less in line with the environment in which the organization RSHUDWHV7KLV« process« may not 
be discerned by the managers  until the drift becomes so marked that performance decline 
results¶. The latter is a standard Darwinian tenet, which argues that if an organization is 
embedded in an external context that challenges it; then, the internal context of the organization 
need to provide it with sufficient tools to respond to such challenges, or otherwhise, the 
probability of survival might decrease. 
In sum, strategies are part of internal efforts to match the external conditions to increase 
chances of survival. However, as strategies get executed, deliberate or unexpected outcomes 
might emerge (Mintzberg, 1978). Such outcomes define the overall performance of a university, 
from which assessments of achieved competitive advantage could be drawn. At least in principle, 
those universities that best fit in with their external context would be more likely to survive, and 
achieve some competitive advantage (although this does not mean that their fit has to be perfect). 
But, the real problem here is how exactly could we assess competitive advantage?  
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Generally, for for-profit companies, one of the fathers of strategy Porter would argue that 
µ$FRPSDQ\FDQRXWSHUIorm rivals only if it can establish a difference that it can preserve¶
62), which is why Armstrong and Shimizu broadly define µcompetitive advantage [as] ZKHQ«
[an organization] can produce more economically and/or better satisfy customer needs, and thus 
enjoys superior performance UHODWLYH WR LWV FRPSHWLWRUV¶ (2007, 961). Better satisfy customer 
needs, means precisely achieving some fit with their external context. This basic definition of 
competitive advantage, however, hides how difficult it could potentially be to apply it to 
universities. In other words, to assess whether competitive advantage has been achieved in 
higher education could be challenging for various reasons. First, many universities, if not most, 
are working to develop an advantage. Therefore, even if a university clearly achieves it, it would 
be difficult to sustain it (Ghemawat, 1986). Second, knowing when an advantage has been 
successfully sustained could also be complicated. In more dynamic environments, a year of 
sustained superior performance could be relevant, in others it might be decades. Third, going 
back to thinking about for-profit companies, if a company, as Armstrong and Shimizu argue, 
µ«SURGXFH>V@PRUHHFRQRPLFDOO\«¶ (2007, 961), it could achieve superior performance in terms 
of profits, and thus, for companies, profits are an indication of competitive advantage. However, 
for most higher education institutions this would be a limited definition, as there is a significant 
proportion of universities (although not all) that are not for-profit. Certainly, in England, the 
latter is the case for all public universities. Therefore, the question emerges on what competitive 
advantage is for not-for-profit organizations and how could someone know if not-for-profit 
organizations±such as some universities±have competitive advantage?  
Now, let me be clear, the fact that non-for-profit universities±which represent a very 
significant portion of higher education±are not as prone to be described in terms of competitive 
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advantage, does not mean that competition and competitive thinking have not already been a part 
of the ethos of the sector. Higher education is a positional good, which entails that, for instance, 
students benefit from a degree inasmuch as the degree opens doors to better status in society. 
Thus, this has derived, for a long time now, in higher education sectors where, as Marginson 
argues, µcompetition is analysed in terms of hierarchy and power¶, as those universities capable 
of bestowing more elite social status on their members become more sought-after (2006, 3). 
Hence, this shows us that competitive thinking in higher education is not exclusive to current 
neoliberal times. Neoliberalism has only made it more blatant. 
In higher education, different ways to map and measure such hierarchies have emerged. 
Certainly, a possible way±and probably the most popular nowadays±to define higher education 
hierarchies are rankings (Horta, 2009; Marginson, 2008). Yet, not everyone agrees on the 
validity of rankings. The latter is the result of universities facing performance measurement 
ambiguity. Universities are multi-mission organizations (Scott, 2006; Shattock, 2010). They do 
research, they teach, they do public engagement, they work with industry and spin off 
enterprises, among other things. Measurements such as rankings are usually weak, precisely 
because they weigh differently the various missions, with some rankings giving more weight to 
the research mission, while others to teaching. The latter derives in disparate university 
distributions. For example, different rankings in England have tried to order universities (e.g. the 
Guardian, the Times, Times Higher Education, QS, etc.). However, this generally results in 
contradictory distributions of universities, with some universities ranking at the top of one 
ranking, but much lower in others, given the differences in methodologies. It is important to 
note, nonetheless, that regardless of the debates around rankings, these have become incredibly 
popular, and are used by many students and academics.  
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As rankings might not be ideal to understand competitive advantage in higher education, 
let us look at alternatives. Another possibility is to look at OHDGHUV¶ sensemaking and explore how 
they are conceiving their competitive environments, and which universities in them they believe 
have competitive advantage. This idea emerges from the work of Porac et al. (1989) on cognitive 
communities, and their idea±further reviewed by Hodgkinson (1997)±that more than objective 
assessments of competition, what matters is which organizations people perceive as their 
competitiors, and how do people subjectively assess their relative standing against them. This is 
certainly a subjectivist approach, but a highly relevant one, as one could argue that the ways 
leaders simplify their complex competitive environments (Jenkins, 2014), reducing them into 
classifications of which organization is ahead and which is falling behind, dictates more closely 
what these leaders will do than some objective assessment of competitive advantage. This way of 
looking at strategic issues LV UHODWHG WR ZKDW &KDIIHH FDOOV LQWHUSUHWLYH VWUDWHJ\ µ«orienting 
metaphors or frames of reference that allow the organization and its environment to be 
understood by organizational stakeholders¶ (1985, 93). A model that Maasen and Potman (1990, 
DUJXHµshould prevail [in higher education] instead of the more commonly applied adaptive 
model¶. The latter is suggested because higher education is a very particular sector, where the 
complexity of internal and external contexts could be significant and strategy could be seen as 
the integration of a plethora of micro-strategies that vary from one department to another.  
Making it, thus, fundamental for OHDGHUV¶ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV LH VHQVHPDNLQJ WR JXLGH them in 
some way through all this complexity (Abreu Pederzini, 2017).  
In short, competitive advantage in higher education could be explored through OHDGHUV¶
sensemaking of competitive advantage. Here, sensemaking refers to a µprocess of social 
construction in which individuals attempt to interpret and explain sets of cues from their 
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environments. This happens throuJK WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI ³DFFRXQWV´±discursive constructions of 
reality that interpret or explain±RUWKURXJKWKH³DFWLYDWLRQ´RIH[LVWLQJDFFRXQWV¶ (Maitlis, 2005, 
21). Weick et al. define RQHRIWKHNH\IHDWXUHVRIVHQVHPDNLQJE\VD\LQJWKDWµSensemaking is 
about the interplay of action and interpretation¶ (2005, 409). The latter is truly important for my 
purposes here, because it suggests that sensemaking is about creating a dialogue between the 
way people interpret their worlds, and the way they act in them, and vice versa. Thus, by 
developing accounts (Day and Nedungadi, 1994; Maitlis and Christianson, 2014) that explain 
their competitive environments (i.e. who their competitors are and what does it take to compete), 
university leaders could be simplifying complex competitive contexts, as to know how to interact 
with them. Making us, then, naturally wonder, how do university leaders, as part of this process, 
make sense of one of the most key and fundamental constructs of marketization: competitive 
advantage? Researching the latter question means, therefore, to research what Porter, in an 




Two universities in Britain were selected for this study, as these universities represent two 
examples of public English universities that are considered close competitors, where focusing on 
two closely related cases provides the opportunity for fine-grained analysis and comparisons 
(Yin, 2003). These two selected universities will not provide a final and absolute answer to the 
question of university leaders¶ competitive advantage sensemaking, because as aforementioned, 
the latter depends a lot on context. However, when it comes to research questions that encompass 
such complexity, one should at least look, as Stake argues, at instrumental cases that could 
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expand our knowledge and shed some light on the research problem (1995). In this case, UniA 
and UniB are part of a country, England, which has been characterized precisely by its strong 
trend towards the marketization of higher education. Additionally, these two universities have 
been described as extremely competitive rivals. Their rivalry emerges from the historical links 
they both share, as both universities were founded around the same time in the 1960s. 
Furthermore, within this group of 1960s universities, UniA and UniB have both been considered 
the leaders of the group at different points in time. The latter derived in a competitive cross-
culture, as they arguably considered themselves part of the same strategic group and constantly 
fighting for its leadership.  More importantly, they faced together the marketization awakening in 
England during the Thatcherite period in the 1980s.  
A total of 19 semi-structured interviews were done, as these were considered the optimal 
available method to access the subjective ways of thinking of current or recent senior leaders at 
UniA and UniB. Of the 19 interviewees, 14 were current or recent senior leaders of these two 
universities. These 14 core interviewees were selected because they hold±or recently held±very 
senior positions in these universities, including: university President (known as Vice-Chancellor 
in England), Vice-President (known as Pro-Vice-Chancellor in England), Chief Operating 
Officer, and strategy or planning director and analyst. Thus, these 14 core interviews allowed me 
to access in-depth the ways of thinking of senior leaders in these two universities.  
Before I started interviewing people, I did a documentary review, where a comprehensive 
collection of documents was gathered. Documents included internal documents from each 
university (e.g. their own institutional memories), and published external articles regarding these 
two universities (e.g. newspaper articles narrating events of news about these universities). This 
preliminary documentary review revealed that, as it is standard for English universities, UniA 
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and UniB benchmark themselves against the strategic group that contains universities from 
similar historical backgrounds. That group (i.e. the group of 1960s universities in England) has 
faced two remarkably important periods. First, the 1960s when these universities were founded. 
Second, the 1980s when neoliberal Thatcherite reforms started. The latter reforms included 
devolving some powers back to universities, initiating the Research Assessment Exercise to 
make universities compete for quality research funding, introducing funding cuts to make the 
sector more operationally effective, and introducing tuition fees for international students, among 
others. As it will be presented in the findings, UniA and UniB had significantly different 
performances in both periods. UniA leading in the 1960s, and UniB in the 1980s Thatcherite 
period. Thus, a competitive cross-culture developed between both places, where they are 
constantly watching what the other is doing and/or which is doing better.  
Finally, it is important to note that the latter entails that the analysis of these two 
universities was made assuming that they have faced a similar (i.e. quasi-homogenous) external 
context. In some ways, this is valid as they have shared a lot. However, completely similar 
external contexts are almost impossible, as given the complexities of external contexts, 
differences are to be expected. Thus, this assumption is just an instrumental assumption to allow 
for an analysis. Yet, it must be remembered that it is an assumption. More importantly, the 
internal environment of both universities was certainly different (something that the first-order 
findings make clear and which implications are addressed in that section). 
The core 14 interviews focused on exploring how interviewees explained the competitive 
advantage or disadvantage of their university precisely during the relevant periods of the 1960s 
and the 1980s. Given the strong influence that the rivalry between both universities had on the 
universities, all interviewees were knowledgeable about it and its historical roots. More 
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importantly, preliminary informal discussions to negotiate these interviews, revealed that 
focusing on two past and historical periods would enable interviewees to be more open, than if I 
had explored the current situation, as people were not as willing to talk about their current 
strategic position. The latter is a usual intricacy of exploring strategic issues, as strategy by 
nature tends to be something people prefer to protect.  
The remaining 5 non-core interviews, were done to triangulate information. Of the 5 non-
core interviews, 3 were done with very senior leaders at other universities, which leaders at UniA 
or UniB mentioned as role models. The other 2 interviews were with senior and well-known 
sector experts. All 19 interviews were in-depth interviews lasting at least an hour, with many 
extending much longer, some as long as four hours. In total, approximately 35 hrs. of 
interviewing were collected. Interviews were semi-structured. I had a basic interview agenda 
with some initial and essential questions, divided into 5 topics: the past of the university, the 
conditions of the environment during the explored period, the competitive environment during 
the explored period, the ways in which it could be said that the university had or not achieved 
competitive advantage, and the reasons that explained why and how the university accomplished 
or not an advantage. However, each interview varied depending on the interviewee and the 
direction he or she would take. Data collection stopped when reasonable saturation was reached. 
 
Data analysis 
I transcribed and coded all interviews, and also coded the documents (where appropriate). The 
data was analyzed in two steps, following what Langley and Abdallah call the Gioia method 
(2016). First of all, a first-order analysis of open-coding µto discover themes and patterns in 
HYHQWV DQG LQIRUPDQWV
 DFFRXQWV¶ (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991, 437). This first-order analysis 
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produced a historical descriptive narrative of how interviewees described each university in the 
two explored periods. In other words, the first-order analysis put order on the data, to prepare it 
for a second round of coding, now focused on the research question.  Thus, a second-order 
analysis looked for the underlying patterns across competitive advantage accounts, first within 
cases and then across cases (Yin, 2003). The second-order step is basically about finding and 
building the necessary theory to explain the first-order findings, and thus, it entails frequent 
µFRPSDULVRQ RI RQH¶V GDWD WR D QDVFHQW PRGHO emerging from analysis¶ (Walsh and Bartunek, 
2011, 1022).  
Given the specific focus of the project on competitive advantage, it is clear that this is not 
a purely inductive project. Actually, as Phillips and Pugh (2010) argue, pure induction is 
probably a utopia. In short, following Basit (2003, 144), , DFFHSW WKDW µwe come to qualitative 
research with whatever understanding of analysis we bring from previous work¶In this case the 
targeted focus on competitive advantage is the main previous understanding that is brought into 
this research. And, therefore, it became the guideline for the second-order coding. In short, as the 
previous section points out, competitive advantage is a core strategic management concept that is 
related to two fundamental issues: superior performance and relative standing against 
competitors. Hence, superior performance and relative standing against competitors were the two 
key criteria used when doing the second-order analysis. These two criteria allowed me to identify 
the comments related to competitive advantage, from which codes were constructed to theorize 
about what the interviewees were saying about competitive advantage. 
It must be acknowledged that the methodology has certain limitations, of which the most 
important might be its external validity, given the specific context where it was carried. Another 
potential limitation, as explored by Golden (1992), is that interviews as a method are far from 
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flawless. For instance, interview accounts might be biased by posterior or current events, or 
simply by a natural loss of detail. This is why a documentary review was also carried, so that it 
could help tackle some of the limitations of interviewing. 
 
First-Order Findings 
The external context 
As aforementioned, the researched period (1960s-early 1990s) was divided into two stages, the 
Robbins Stage (1960s-1970s) and the Thatcher Stage (1980s-early 1990s). The Robbins Stage 
begins with the Robbins Report, which was a grand inquiry into higher education done in the 
1960s (Watson, 2014), a decade characterized by a proactive ethos and student activism. Before 
the Robbins Report, the English higher education sector was basically an elite sector, to which 
only a small percentage of eligible young adults had access (Perkin, 1972). Robbins mainly 
recommended an expansion of the sector. Additionally, it pushed for the opening of six new 
universities, which came to be known as the plate-glass universities (Beloff, 1968; Perkin, 1972). 
Importantly, back then universities were basically funded by the Universities Grants Committee, 
which provided funds to universities but allowed them to operate autonomously (Henkel, 2000).  
 The Thatcher Stage represents the period of Thatcherite reformation, which brought some 
of the first pro-market pro-competition efforts into English higher education. This period started 
DIWHU7KDWFKHU¶VDUULYDOWRSRZHULQ0DMRUFKDQJHVLQFOXGHGHQGLQJWKHRYHUVHDVVWXGHQWV¶
subsidy (Watson, 2014). Furthermore, cuts were implemented across the higher education sector 
which significantly affected universities. Perhaps the most representative change was the 
introduction of competition for research funding (Shattock, 2010). Thatcher wanted to improve 
the efficiency and competitiveness of universities. To do this the Research Assessment Exercise 
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was introduced. The first one took place in 1986. With the introduction of the Research 
AssessmenW ([HUFLVH XQLYHUVLWLHV¶ UHVHDUFK RXWSXW ZDV WR EH DVVHVVHG WR GHFLGH ZKLFK
universities had better research performance. Those with better performance would receive more 
research funding, and those with worse performance would receive less. This changed the 
system, at least in terms of research, into a competitive system where the best performers were at 
the top. Thatcherism promoted a new-right, pro-market ethos (Raffe and Croxford, 2013), 




This university was in a favorable and privileged status during the Robbins Stage. UniA was a 
younger university compared to other older universities in England. During the 1960s UniA was 
widely popular, as it had an attractive location in a resort city, characterized by a liberal ethos, 
much as that embraced by the 1960s. UniA had an interdisciplinary model, and was known as a 
tolerant university, where students were free to express themselves. Thus, healthy student 
activism was usual in UniA. Due to these features and the youthful liberal hippie atmosphere of 
the 1960s, UniA became very popular. Documentary analysis evidenced stories of students 
opting out of prestigious older universities to go to UniA, and cases of students being accepted at 
prestigious older universities but rejected from UniA. Therefore, during the Robbins Stage UniA 
had status, which in the ambiguous multi-mission higher education sector (Scott, 2006; Shattock, 
2010) is one of the favorite proxies for superior performance. Additionally, the interdisciplinary 
model turned out to be considerably successful, attracting, for example, top staff that otherwise 
would have preferred an older university.  
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Things were, however, different for UniA during the Thatcher Stage. Given its significant 
success during the 1960s and 70s, UniA got locked into a 1960s worldview. Interviewees 
described UniA as stuck during the 80s. People at the university became self-complacent, self-
centered, and got too comfortable with their status. Thus, UniA became disconnected from the 
broader higher education sector. As the external environment changed, the liberal atmosphere 
faded away, and therefore, the effect that a liberal, tolerant and edgy organizational culture 
originally had RQ8QL$¶VVWDWXV, decreased in the Thatcher Stage. The 80s required universities to 
compete against each other, to have more efficient operations, to work closer to industry, and to 
generate alternative funding sources, among other neoliberalist ideas that contrasted with the 
left-wing thinking of UniA. Hence, during the Thatcher Stage, UniA lost most of its status, and 
the university started drifting. 
 
UniB  
Things at UniB were almost the complete opposite. Its location in an industrial zone was 
unattractive, and the liberal culture of UniA was not representative of UniB. The 
interdisciplinary ethos was also mainly absent in UniB. Furthermore, UniB was close to local 
industry since its inception. Therefore, the university had a strong industry inclination, which did 
not really relate to the 1960s atmosphere, when universities were still seen as places of 
intellectual exploration detached from the mundane interests of businesses. The industry ethos at 
UniB caused problems in the university, including student and staff discontent and protests.  
As the external context changed towards the Thatcherite competitive period 8QL%¶V
status changed. Because of its business oriented culture and its talented leadership, UniB quickly 
UHVSRQGHG WR 7KDWFKHU¶V FXWV E\ engaging in a plethora of entrepreneurial activities that 
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generated alternative funding. This created an entrepreneurial culture that propelled the 
university into a very different status. From being a university with basically no status in the 
1960s, it bHFDPHRQHRI7KDWFKHU¶VIDYRULWHXQLYHUVLWLHV,WVHQWUHSUHQHXULDODQGLQGXVWU\Rriented 
culture fitted well into the Thatcher Stage, and allowed the university to improve its income base 
and get adapted to the Research Assessment Exercise funding dynamic, where it was 




,QWHUYLHZHHV PDGH VHQVH RI WKHLU XQLYHUVLW\¶V FRPSHWLWLYH DGYDQWDJHGLVDGYDQWDJH LQ YDULRXV
ways. In the case of UniA, all interviewees assessed the university as having competitive 
advantage, or at least superior status, during the Robbins Stage. The way interviewees made 
VHQVH RI WKHLU XQLYHUVLW\¶V FRPSHWLWLYH DGYDQWDJH UHYROYHs around three main sensemaking 
dilemmas. First, interviewees related the alleged competitive advantage of UniA during this 
period, WR 8QL$¶V OHIW-wing and edgy culture, which fitted in with the Robbins Stage activist, 
hippie and expansionist vibe. Thus, here we find the first competitive advantage sensemaking 
dilemma of whether the university fitted in with its external environment, which in this case, 
according to interviewees, it did during the Robbins Stage. Second, interviewees explained 
8QL$¶V FRPSHWLWLYH DGYDQWDJH DV D FRQVHTXHQFH RI LWV WKHQ OHDGHUV¶ FDSDFLW\ WR VHL]H WKH
opportunity that fitting in with the external environment provided. Therefore, the second 
competitive advantage sensemaking dilemma is not just an issue of the university fitting in with 
the external environment, but revolves around whether leaders at the university believed the 
university had leveraged that fit to improve further its status or not. In short, the second 
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sensemaking dilemma is about whether the university had seized or missed the opportunity of fit. 
For example, interviewees argued that UniA¶V edgy and tolerant culture enabled students and 
faculty to freely and openly interact with each other. Then, such level of connectedness among 
members of the university was leveraged by the interdisciplinary model of the university, as it 
enabled people from different disciplines to work with each other. Eventually, the 
interdisciplinary model was an asset itself, which allowed the university to continue improving 
its status.  
Third, and fLQDOO\ LQWHUYLHZHHV PDGH VHQVH RI 8QL$¶V FRPSHWLWLYH DGYDQWDJH E\
comparing the university against a frame of reference consisting of the ancient and most 
prestigious English universities. In other words, the third competitive advantage sensemaking 
dilemma is about gold standard universities against which the status of UniA could be compared. 
These gold standard universities form a sort of frame of reference that generates an archetype to 
UniA leaders regarding how does the ideal university looks like, and how does UniA compere to 
the ideal. Thus, for interviewees, competitive advantage was not just about assessing 
environmental fit and opportunity seizing, but also about comparing their assessments against the 
DQFLHQW DQG SUHVWLJLRXV XQLYHUVLWLHV )RU H[DPSOH PRVW LQWHUYLHZHHV FRQVLGHUHG WKDW 8QL$¶V
capacity to attract students and staff that could have gone to ancient English universities 
illustrated the high status of UniA during the Robbins Stage. In short, DV SDUW RI OHDGHU¶V
sensemaking of their competitive environment, beyond their strategic group (i.e. the group of 
their close competitors) they also had a subjective account on which universities were the leading 
universities across the whole higher education sector. As it is usually the case in higher 
education, these group of top universities was formed by old universities that possess long-
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standing reputations. The latter would be what some interviewees called the gold standard in 
English higher education, and it includes universities such as, for example, Cambridge. 
The Thatcher Stage showed a similar competitive advantage sensemaking around the 
core dilemmas. Interestingly, all interviewees agreed that UniA lost its competitive advantage in 
this stage, although when it came to making sense of competitive disadvantage interviewees did 
not use a frame of reference. However, interviewees did make sense of the loss of competitive 
advantage in terms of environmental fit, or in this case, environmental misfit. For most 
interviewees, UniA became locked into an edgy, activist, and left-wing culture that was no 
longer relevant in the right-wing, pro-market and competitive Thatcherite environment. Finally, 
missing opportunities was also consistently highlighted. Here, missing opportunities would 
represent the antithesis of what originally was referred to as seizing opportunities during the 
Robbins Stage. Therefore, interviewees made sense of the loss of competitive advantage by 
arguing that the university became self-complacent and isolated, and that nobody did much to try 
WR FKDQJH WKDW ,QWHUYLHZHHV¶ VHQVHPDNLQJ RI 8QL$¶V FRmpetitive advantage is summarized in 
Table 1. 
[Please Insert Table 1 here] 
For UniB the story is almost diametrically opposed, although the same three sensemaking 
dilemmas GHVFULEHLQWHUYLHZHHV¶FRPSHWLWLYHDGYDQWDJHVHQVHPDNLQJ'XULQJWKH5REELQV6WDJH
interviewees perceived the university as having competitive disadvantage. Again, for the case of 
disadvantage, interviewees did not use a frame of reference. Environmental fit was a key factor 
in making sense of the lack of competitive advantage. Most interviewees acknowledged that the 
culture that enabled UniA to fit in with the 1960s and thrive during the Robbins Stage, was 
basically inexistent at UniB. By contrast, interviewees mentioned that the industry oriented 
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culture at UniB was a misfit with the Robbins Stage. Moreover, interviewees mentioned that the 
university did not want to take the opportunity, for example, of an interdisciplinary model, which 
had been widely successful at UniA. All of this contributed to a non-optimum status, including 
protests and discontent among students and staff. 
7KH 7KDWFKHU 6WDJH FKDQJHG HYHU\WKLQJ IRU 8QL% ,QWHUYLHZHHV DJUHHG RQ 8QL%¶V
competitive advantage during this stage. Furthermore, interviewees made sense of such 
FRPSHWLWLYH DGYDQWDJH DUJXLQJ WKDW WKH XQLYHUVLW\¶s enterprising and industry oriented culture 
fitted in with the new competitive, industry oriented, and neoliberal Thatcherite external 
environment. However, interviewees did not see competitive advantage as solely the 
consequence of environmental fit, but also as a consequence of university leaders¶ FDSDFLW\ WR
seize the opportunity of fit. For example, interviewees described a highly proactive 
entrepreneurial intent and culture that went far beyond the inherited industry oriented ethos. 
This, for most intHUYLHZHHV HYLGHQFHG WKH XQLYHUVLW\¶V FDSDFLW\ WR VHL]H WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ RI
environmental fit. Finally, for the Thatcher Stage all interviewees again justified the assessed 
competitive advantage by using a group of prestigious and ancient English universities as a 
frame of reference. The most quoted example was that a cross culture had developed between 
UniB and a very prestigious older English university. Such cross culture was illustrated by the 
exchange of staff and studenWV ,QWHUYLHZHHV¶VHQVHPDNLQJRI 8QL%¶VFRPSHWLWLYHDGYDQWDJH LV
summarized in Table 2. 
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
A final important finding relates only to UniA. Some interviewees at UniA frequently 
and consistently talked about the current status of UniA. They argued that since the mid2000s a 
new leadership team had come to the university to change the deteriorating trajectory of the 
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university. One interviewee said of the current unLYHUVLW\ 3UHVLGHQW WKDW KH ZDV µ«D ZDNHXS
FDOO¶. The interesting point here is that interviewees, including some who are members of this 
new leadership team, made sense of the current strategy of the university based on their accounts 
RQ SDVW FRPSHWLWLYH DGYDQWDJH )RU H[DPSOH PRVW LQWHUYLHZHHV DUJXHG WKDW 8QL$¶V
interdisciplinary model was a key factor in WKH XQLYHUVLW\¶V FRPSHWLWLYH DGYDQWDJH GXULQJ WKH
Robbins Stage. Analogously, most said that currently UniA could improve its status because its 
new strategy is reviving some of the old sources of success, including especially the 
interdisciplinary model. For instancHVRPHRQHVDLGµ«ZHDUHJRLQJEDFNWRWKHVDPHFRQFHSWRI
interdisciplinarity in the same ZD\ LW ZDV FRQFHLYHG LQ WKH V¶. While another interviewee 
remarked that a current model of cross-disciplinary research themes was reviving the 
interdisciplinary ethos that characterized the early success of the university. This finding is 
limited because it only applies to UniA. Interviewees at UniB did not want to talk much about 
the current status of the university. However, this final finding on UniA is relevant because it 
illustrates that sensemaking of the present or IXWXUH µ...make[s] sense in a way that relates to 
previoXVXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGH[SHULHQFH¶ (Gioia et al., 1994, 365). 
 
Conclusion 
As marketization in higher education in many countries has become imminent, it is important to 
understand what market constructs in higher education mean and what they entail for people who 
must work with and respond to them (Clark, 1983; Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Horta, 2009; 
Marginson, 2013). In this paper, I have particularly focused on how university leaders might be 
making sense of the cornerstone market construct of competitive advantage (Hamel and 
Prahalad, 2005; Miles and Snow, 1984). However, as it was here discussed, competitive 
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advantage is difficult to define and measure, especially in the case of universities. So, the 
subjective sense WKDW OHDGHUV¶ PDNH RI WKLV NH\ FRQVWUXFW LV RI XWPRVW LPSRUWDQFH HVSHFLDOO\
FRQVLGHULQJ WKDW XQLYHUVLW\ OHDGHUV¶ FRPSHWLWLYH DGYDQWDJH VHQVHPDNLQJ FRXOG KDYH SURIRXQG
consequences for future decisions taken at universities. Therefore, an important question is, how 
do university leaders make sense of competitive advantage?  
In this paper, this question was approached by using the cases of two young English 
universities, which have for long been close competitors. Particularly, the findings have 
illustrated the value of approaching competitive advantage through Porac HW DO¶V cognitive 
communities approach (1989), where competition is seen not through an absolute frame, but 
through subjectivist perspectives that take into account the sensemaking processes that various 
actors go through as part of their relating to their external environment (Hodgkinson, 1997).  
Specifically, this approach has shown us how important university leDGHUV¶ FRPSHWLWLYH
advantage sensemaking could be, as it allows them to survive in complex and ambiguous 
environments by µsomehow cut[ting] through this ambiguity and frame a competitive arena by 
classifying and simplifying the diversity of«>XQLYHUVLWLHV@ NQRZQWRH[LVW¶ (Porac et al., 1989, 
406).  
In addition, I have further developed this subjectivist approach to competitive advantage, 
by suggesting WKDWXQLYHUVLW\OHDGHUV¶FRPSHtitive advantage sensemaking could be described as 
revolving around at least three sensemaking dilemmas. The first dilemma is about a subjective 
assessment of environmental fit or misfit (Miles and Snow, 1984). The second dilemma is about 
a subjective assessment of whether past leaders seized the opportunities of fit or avoided the 
threats of misfit. Finally, the third dilemma is about finding a frame of reference (Day and 
Nedungadi, 1994) that allows leaders to determine whether competitive advantage was achieved 
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by comparing their standing against those they believe are the leading universities. Thus, it was 
illustrated that theoretical conceptions of environmental fit/misfit promoted by outstanding 
intellectuals of strategy such as Freeman (2013), are not only theoretically valuable but also 
practically worthy, as university leaders use such tools to make sense of competitive advantage. 
$GGLWLRQDOO\ ILQGLQJV LOOXVWUDWHG WKDW XQLYHUVLW\ OHDGHUV¶ VHQVH RI their universities relative 
standing against a gold standard, was their main guideline regarding competitive advantage, but 
that when it came to competitive disadvantage they were harsher, as they presumably assessed it 
based on possible normative beliefs independent of competitors. Finally, the findings showed us 
how the value of competitive advantage retrospective accounts possibly lies in their implications 
for ongoing and prospective sensemaking (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014).  
In conclusion, we can learn a lot about the implications of neoliberal policies by 
exploring their impact on the ways of thinking of various actors in higher education. As much 
has been said about students¶ and staff¶V UHDFWLRQV WRQHROLEHUDOLVP, this paper has focused, by 
contrast, on university leaders, and particularly on their way of making sense of one the most 
central constructs of marketization: competitive advantage. It is impressive to witness how the 
leaders of a sector±higher education±that once allegedly prided itself from being detached of 
mundane market principles, now blatantly thinks and considers the market ethos, as to even 
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